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Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR GUIDANCE ON IS STABILIZING MEASURES DRAFT

REFS: (A) NATO 6231 (B) NATO 6245

VIENNA FOR US MBFR DEL

1. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE ON IS DRAFT (REF A) ON
STABILIZING MEASURES KEYED BY PARAS AND RESPONDING TO
QUESTIONS POSED IN REF B.

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2. PARA 3. YOU SHOULD RESERVE ON THIS PARAGRAPH FOR
THE MOMENT. FURTHER GUIDANCE IS IN PREPARATION.

3. PARA 4. THE US BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT TO RETAIN

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THE US-SOVIET FOCUS OF PHASE I. IT SHOULD BE RECALLED
THAT THE MEASURES AS PRESENTED WILL ONLY APPLY TO US-
SOVIET FORCES, THUS IT WOULD APPEAR CONTRARY TO THIS
ALLIED OBJECTIVE TO PRESENT THE MEASURES AS APPLYING
ALLIED OBJECTIVE TO PRESENT THE MEASURES AS APPLYING

MORE BROADLY. TO SUGGEST NOTIFICATION TO ALL PARTIES
WOULD GIVE THE EAST A HANDLE ON THE APPLICATION OF
THE MEASURES TO ALL PARTIES. MOREOVER, SINCE THE
EAST WILL PROBABLY WISH TO EXPAND THE COVERAGE, THE
ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO USE THIS DESIRE FOR BARGAINING
PURPOSES. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF THE NEGOTIATED MEASURE
IN THE AGREEMENT REQUIRED ONLY US-SOVIET NOTIFICATION,
WE WOULD ESTABLISH AN APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATION MECHANISM
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF AN
ALLIED CONSENSUS FAVORS NOTIFICATION TO ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS (WHO WILL PRESUMABLY BE PARTIES TO THE
AGREEMENT), THE US COULD JOIN IT. UNLESS INDIRECT
PARTICIPANTS BECOME PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT IT
WOULD SEEM INAPPROPRIATE THAT THEY SHOULD RECEIVE
DIRECT NOTIFICATION. THEY WOULD, OF COURSE, RECEIVE
NOTIFICATION VIA THE ALLIANCE MECHANISM CITED ABOVE.

4. PARA 4. OCTOBER 1 WAS CHOSEN TO ACCOMODATE A 90-DAY
REQUIREMENT FOR CHANGES IN PRE-ANNOUNCED MOVEMENTS IN
AN EARLIER DRAFT. SINCE THE IS DRAFT CALLS FOR A
60-DAY REQUIREMENT, THE ANNOUNCEMENT DATE SHOULD BE
CHANGED TO NOVEMBER 1. IF DECEMBER 1 WERE CHOSEN,
TROOPS ENTERING OR LEAVING THE AREA ON JANUARY 1 WOULD
HAVE BEEN PRE-ANNOUNCED BY ONLY 30 DAYS.

5. PARA 4. THE TERM "CERTAIN" REFLECTS THE PROVISION
OF PARA 5 THAT MOVEMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD
REMAIN IN (OR OUTSIDE) THE AREA FOR LESS THAN 30
DAYS MAY BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SCHEDULE. THE ANNOUNCE-
MENTS IN PARAS 5 AND 11 INCLUDE ALL OTHER MOVEMENTS
OUT OF THE AREA, NOT JUST OUTWARD ROTATION. THIS
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"OUT OF THE AREA" REQUIREMENT IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE
CONFIRMATION THAT SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS INTO THE
AREA ARE COUNTER-BALANCED BY MOVEMENT OUT. HOWEVER,
THE MORE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS OF PARAS 6 AND 7 DO NOT
INCLUDE MOVEMENTS OUT OF THE AREA, AND AN INCREASE
(OR A DECREASE OF LESS THAN 10 PERCENT) IN THE
PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED MONTHLY TOTAL OF TROOPS MOVING
OUT OF THE AREA NEED ONLY BE REPORTED AFTER IT HAS
TAKEN PLACE (UNDER PARA 11).

6. PARA 9. WE ALREADY HAVE PROVIDED SOME DISTINCTION
IN THE PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF DIFFERENT SIZED UNITS BY
EXCLUDING FROM THE PARA 6 REQUIREMENT UNITS OF LESS

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THAN 1000 PERSONNEL. FURTHER, VARYING THE EXTENT OF ADVANCE NOTICE WITH THE SIZE OF THE MOVEMENT WOULD INTRODUCE AN UNNECESSARY ADDITIONAL COMPLEXITY. MOREOVER, WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC CHANGES

WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE COMPLEXITIES OF PARAS 6, 9 AND 10 AND YET RETAIN THE ESSENTIAL EFFECT OF THE RESTRAINT. WE AGREE WITH MISSION'S APPROACH ON THE DUTCH/BELGIAN FOOTNOTE.

7. FOOTNOTE TO MEASURE II TITLE. WE WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE THE DEFINITION OF MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISE AS IS EXCEPT AS DISCUSSED IN PARA 10 BELOW. THE UK FOOTNOTE COULD CREATE A LOOPHOLE WHICH WOULD VITIATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MEASURES IN TERMS OF WARNING, REDUCING THE AMBIGUITY OF EXERCISES AND MINIMIZING THE POSSIBLE USE OF EXERCISES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. FURTHERMORE, THE PRESENT LANGUAGE WOULD APPEAR SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO MEET FUTURE ALLIED NEEDS AND CONTINGENCIES, WITHOUT SUGGESTING TO THE EAST AN EASY WAY TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROVISION. IN ADDITION, THE CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED IN PARA 2, ABOVE, APPLY HERE.

8. PARA 12. WE BELIEVE THERE IS BENEFIT IN LIMITING WHEREVER POSSIBLE THE MEASURE TO US-SOVIET FORCES, SINCE SOVIET FORCES ARE THE MAJOR CONCERN OF THE
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ALLIES AND SINCE THE EAST SHOULD BE MADE TO BARGAIN FOR THEIR PROBABLE INTEREST IN RECEIVING INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER THAN US-ALLIED FORCES. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE TO THE EAST THROUGH THE BACK DOOR INFORMATION WHICH THEY WOULD FIND DESIRABLE IN TERMS OF ALLIED EXERCISES BUT WHICH IS MUCH LESS IMPORTANT TO THE ALLIES IN TERMS OF WARSAW PACT EXERCISES. WITH RESPECT TO MEASURE II, WHILE SOME INFORMATION WHICH IS REQUIRED MAY APPLY TO ALL FORCES IN A MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE (E.G. DATES AND LOCATION), THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPATING US AND SOVIET FORCES. FOR THE US AND SOVIET UNION TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPORTING ACTIVITIES OF THEIR ALLIES WOULD BE AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN AND COULD ALSO APPEAR TO DETRACT FROM THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEASURE III CAN BE LIMITED TO US-SOVIET FORCES WITHOUT DIFFICULTY EVEN WITH MULTILATERAL EXERCISES. AS TO MEASURE IV, IT WILL OBVIOUSLY BE DIFFICULT TO LIMIT OBSERVATIONS TO ONLY US AND DIFFICULT TO LIMIT OBSERVATIONS TO ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES, SINCE MULTILATERAL EXERCISES ARE LIKELY TO BE INTEGRATED AND COORDINATED AMONG

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PARTICIPATING FORCES. ACCORDINGLY, TO WORK OUT MINUTE RESTRICTIONS ON SUCH OBSERVERS WOULD APPEAR IMPRACTICAL, UNNECESSARY, AND SERVE NO PARTICULAR MILITARY OR POLITICAL PURPOSES, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE MAJOR ALLIED CONCERN IS FULL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EXERCISES IN WHICH THE SOVIETS PARTICIPATE.

9. PARA 15(A). NEITHER THE US NOR THE SOVIET UNION COULD, UNDER THIS PROVISION, CONDUCT AN EXERCISE LARGER THAN 35,000/50,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL NOR COULD EITHER PARTICIPATE IN A MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE WHOSE TOTAL OF PARTICIPATING GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL EXCEEDED THIS LEVEL. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE SUCH A LIMITATION WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN NATO'S FAVOR, SINCE IT WOULD INHIBIT A WARSAW PACT BUILDUP UNDER COVER OF AN EXERCISE. END COMMENT.)

10. PARAS 13, 15(C) AND 16. WE ARE STILL EXAMINING
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IMPLICATIONS OF IS DRAFT AS IT PERTAINS TO LIMITATIONS ON EXERCISES, AND HOPE TO HAVE GUIDANCE SHORTLY.

11. WE WOULD PREFER TO RETAIN PARA 3 OF MEASURE III IN THE US DRAFT (STATE 222698). OUR AGREEMENT TO OMIT "LOCATION" FROM THE TITLE OF MEASURE III RESERVED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MEASURE (STATE 238710). THE US HAS NO REQUIREMENT TO CONDUCT EXERCISES WITHIN 50 KMS OF THE FRG-GDR OR FRG-CZECH BORDERS EXCEPT WITHIN MAJOR RAINING AREAS, WHICH WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM THIS LIMIT. SOVIET EXERCISES CONDUCTED WITHIN 50 KMS OF THIS BORDER COULD CAUSE TENSION AND POSSIBLY BE USED AS A COVER FOR SURPRISE ATTACK. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE PROPOSE ADDING TO THE IS DRAFT PARA 3 OF MEASURE III OF THE US DRAFT. IF STRONG CONSENSUS DEVELOPS FOR ELIMINATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH, YOU MAY AGREE TO IT.

12. PARA 16. THE INTENT OF THE SECOND SENTENCE IS TO CLOSE A LOOPHOLE THAT WOULD ALLOW AN EXERCISE OF LONGER THAN 60 DAYS BY SCHEDULING IT AS TWO CONSECUTIVE EXERCISES. IT IS INTENDED TO APPLY ONLY TO EXERCISES OUTSIDE OF MAJOR TRAINING AREAS. THEREFORE THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 16 SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR CLARITY, THE WORD "RESERVATIONS" IN THE THIRD SENTENCE SHOULD BE DELETED AND THE LAST PART OF THE SENTENCE CHANGED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "PROVIDED THAT NO MORE THAN 10,000 PERSONNEL IN UNITS ARE OUTSIDE THEIR PERMANENT MILITARY GARRISONS OR MAJOR TRAINING AREAS EXCEPT THOSE IN THE EXEMPT CATEGORIES IN PARAGRAPH 13/.

13. PARA 17. WE WOULD PREFER THAT ONLY US AND SOVIET OBSERVERS UNDER MBFR PHASE I PROVISIONS BE INVITED TO

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MAJOR EXERCISES INVOLVING US AND SOVIET FORCES SINCE WE
BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE FOCUS OF THE MEASURES
ON US AND SOVIET FORCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE
ALLIES FAVOR OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BEING INVITED TO
SEND OBSERVERS AS Wwell, WE WOULD JOIN SUCH A CONSENSUS. RUSH

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